We Need to Talk About Appeasement

When Russia took Crimea from Ukraine the West responded with shock. The reaction in Eastern and Central Europe was very different, for years leaders in those countries had warned that Russia had never lost its imperialistic ambitions. Fear is particularly rife in the Baltic States who, bar a brief period of independence between World Wards, spent several centuries under the rule of Russia.

If we look at demographics they may have a reason to fear Russian aggression. Estonia and Latvia have sizeable ethnic Russian minorities, particularly in the east of their countries. The county of Ida-Viru in north-eastern Estonia is over 70% Russian, even more ethnically homogenous than Crimea! When Putin decided that he was going to invade Crimea he used the excuse that he was only doing it to protect Russians from the new government in Kiev. In Latvia, Russians are frequently treated like second-class citizens. Perhaps Putin could use this as a pretext to invasion?

Yet there are massive differences between Ukraine/Crimea and the Baltic states. The origins of the Crimean Crisis is the debate of whether Ukraine should tie itself closer to Russia or the EU. There is no such debate in the Baltic States, all three are members of the EU and NATO and are fully within the Western fold. Membership of NATO is of key importance here, no sovereign nation has invaded on of its members since its formation in 1949.

Another difference between Ukraine/Crimea and the Baltic states is of demographics and population. Estonia and Latvia have the highest proportions of ethnic Russians of the former USSR with 24.8% and 26.9% respectively. Compare this to Ukraine which has ‘only’ 17.3% ethnic Russians. But comparing country-wide percentages is not being intellectually honest. Russia has not invaded all of Ukraine, only Crimea. In Crimea 58.8% of the people are Russian. The population of these states is also important. Crimea has a population of 2.4 million, larger than both Estonia (1.3 million) and Latvia (2 million), only Lithuania with a population of 3 million is larger than Crimea. Lithuania has also got far fewer ethnic Russians, who make up only 5.8% of the population. There are more Russians in Crimea than the three Baltic States combined. The Estonian county of Ida-Viru has only 140,000 people in it. Would Putin really risk war with the West over an insignificant Estonian county? (no offence people of Ida-Viru county) When looking at the Baltic States Putin would be forced to do a cost-benefit analysis. He would then find the potential costs way too high and the benefits too few. It would seem inconceivable, but Putin has proved to be unpredictably before and will likely be so in the future.

So if the Baltic States will not be his next target, what will? The most commonly talked about are eastern Ukraine and Moldova.

Moldova is a small, landlocked country sandwiched between Ukraine and Romania. The fact that it does not border Russia, or even the sea, makes it seem strange that it might be the next flashpoint in a new Cold War. The fact that only 9.4% of Moldova is ethnically Russian further confuses the situation. Yet, as was the case with Ukraine, the problem is only part of the country. When Moldova seceded from the Soviet Union in 1991 the eastern portion of Moldova, Transnistria, seceded from Moldova. Although no UN member recognises the independence of Transnistria, it has been de facto independent for over 20 years. Another key issue is the demographics of the pseudo-independent state, it is roughly evenly split between Moldovans, Russians and Ukrainians (32, 30 and 29 respectively). Unlike the Baltic States, Moldova is not an EU or NATO member and hence is not well protected from foreign aggression.

Yet the major problem with invading Transnistria would be how could they get there? The most likely scenario would involve going through Ukraine and possibly Moldova. This could further destabilise the situation in Ukraine, especially since it would put Russian troops extremely close to Ukraine’s 4^th largest city, Odessa. Once they had control of Transnistria there would be the issue of what to do next? To move in/out of Transnistria would involve going through Ukraine, or Moldova and Romania. Considering Russia would have violated the sovereignty of the former two, they would be unlikely to willingly help Russia. Another option would be to take more territory, considering Putin’s actions already, it is not unthinkable. One issue that could prevent Russian action in Transnistria is the reaction that the rest of Moldova would have. Moldova is hoping is one day enter the European fold, Russia violating their sovereignty would likely cause them to seek closer ties with Europe sooner.

So if Transnistria is unlikely to happen, what really are the chances of Russia invading eastern Ukraine? As I have explained previously, no Ukrainian Oblast has more than 40% ethnic Russians (other than Crimea). Yet who says that Russia has to take an entire Oblast, perhaps just part of it. The city of Donetsk is 48% Russian, could Putin decide that he would likely to take that city?

Assigning probabilities is pointless as it all depends on how the West acts going into the future. If the West does nothing then the chances of Russia taking action in Transnistria, eastern Ukraine or the Baltic states would increase. If Putin does go further and the West does not take military action then we are taking about appeasement. I know accusing Putin of acting like Hitler seems drastic, but it is true. Hitler took Czechoslovakia and Poland to ‘protect’ ethnic Germans. If Putin takes Ukraine and Moldova to ‘protect’ ethnic Russians then how is he any different?