Strategising for the Democrats

The election of George W. Bush in 2004 was incredibly close, Bush beat his Democratic rival, John Kerry, by 2.4%. In terms of the Electoral College, Bush won 35 more votes than Kerry. This means that if a state worth 18 or more votes in the Electoral College had voted for Kerry instead of Bush, the former would have won the election.

Everyone knew that the election would be a close one and so Karl Rove, a senior adviser to the Bush-Cheney campaign devised a plan to boost turnout amongst the Republican Party’s evangelical Christian base. So in eleven states around the country Rove managed to get referendums on same-sex marriage bans on the ballot. The hope was that this would encourage evangelicals to turn out to vote to ban same-sex marriage and at the same time they would cast a ballot for George W. Bush. Amongst those states was Ohio, worth 20 votes in the Electoral College, enough to swing the election. The margin of victory was only 2.1%.

Currently the Democrats have 55 Senators to the Republicans’ 45, which means that a net change of six seats would tip the Senate into the hands of the Republicans. So if the Democrats want to keep the Senate they need to be strategic. One of the ways that they can do this is by copying Rove’s 2004 strategy and get issues on the ballot that increase turnout. The Democrats have two issues which could help them in 2014: the minimum wage and marijuana.

According to a recent George Washington University poll, having marijuana legalisation on the ballot makes 40% of people “much more likely” to vote, whilst it makes a further 30% “somewhat more likely” to vote. This is good news for Democrats as it boosts turnout, particularly amongst young people who are notoriously bad at voting in midterms and a heavily Democratic demographic. Another constituency of the Democratic coalition are poorer people, who have the most to gain from raising the minimum wage. It is a massive encouragement for people to vote if what they are voting for is a basically a raise.

The minimum wage is highly popular and very successful on the ballot. Since referendums on the issue started in 1988 it only failed twice, once in Missouri and Montana, both in 1996. Since 2004 it has averaged 66% in favour and only 34% against. Having such a popular question is hugely beneficial to the Democrat in the same race as it brings the question of the minimum wage to more prominence.

If Democrats want to keep hold of the Senate then they need to make sure that Republicans gain no more than five seats (assuming the Democrats gain none). To do this the Democrats should get marijuana and the minimum wage on the ballot in as many states as possible, especially in ones where a close race is expected. Even in states without a competitive Senate race, it is still a good idea to have these initiatives to help bolster House Democrats. There are attempts to get the minimum wage on the ballot in several states, but so far only Alaska and South Dakota definitely have it on the 4^th of November ballot. Alaska is also the only state with marijuana legislation on the ballot and Florida has medical marijuana on the ballot. Alaska is also one of the states with a good chance of going Republican in November, having both on the ballot should boost Senator Mark Begich’s chances of being re-elected.

Ukrainian Crisis Approaches Boiling Point

The crisis in Ukraine has continued to get even hotter over the past week despite attempts by diplomats to secure a peace deal.

Eastern Ukraine has a large proportion of ethnic Russians, and many Ukrainians who are supportive of Russia. This is why the Kremlin has moved its focus from Crimea to the rest of eastern Ukraine. The series of events which resulted in Crimea joining Russia has begun to play out across the east. Armed men have taken numerous government buildings, erected Russian flags and demanded that they be allowed to join Russia. Just like the armed men in Crimea they are too well-organised to simply be pro-Russian locals. Rather, they are mostly members of the Russian armed forces. Of course Russia denies that the militia are connected to the Russian military, but they made the same statements about the militia in Crimea and have since admitted that they were actually Russian soldiers.

Yet, as I have said in my previous posts, these areas are not like Crimea. They are not majority Russian and hence the Ukrainian government will put up more of a fight for control of the region. Already Kiev had sent troops in to take some key positions back from the Russians.

Despite the chaotic situation in the east, there did seem to be some hope that a peaceful solution might actually be reached! The governments of Ukraine, Russia, the US and EU reached an agreement in Geneva. The agreement called for the dissolving of all illegal military groups, amnesty for all anti-government protesters and that the militias that have taken control of government buildings must leave them. Unfortunately that deal seems dead in the water as one of the spokesmen for the separatists has said that they are not bound by the deal.

This all plays perfectly into Putin’s hand; he gets to look like a sensible diplomat whilst continuing to destabilise eastern Ukraine through these separatists. If you want any more proof that Putin is planning on take eastern Ukraine, all you need to do is watch the press conference he held earlier this week in which he referred to the eastern parts of Ukraine as “new Russia”! If that isn’t a clear sign that he plans to go even further into the territory of Ukraine, I don’t know what could be!

We Need to Talk About Appeasement

When Russia took Crimea from Ukraine the West responded with shock. The reaction in Eastern and Central Europe was very different, for years leaders in those countries had warned that Russia had never lost its imperialistic ambitions. Fear is particularly rife in the Baltic States who, bar a brief period of independence between World Wards, spent several centuries under the rule of Russia.

If we look at demographics they may have a reason to fear Russian aggression. Estonia and Latvia have sizeable ethnic Russian minorities, particularly in the east of their countries. The county of Ida-Viru in north-eastern Estonia is over 70% Russian, even more ethnically homogenous than Crimea! When Putin decided that he was going to invade Crimea he used the excuse that he was only doing it to protect Russians from the new government in Kiev. In Latvia, Russians are frequently treated like second-class citizens. Perhaps Putin could use this as a pretext to invasion?

Yet there are massive differences between Ukraine/Crimea and the Baltic states. The origins of the Crimean Crisis is the debate of whether Ukraine should tie itself closer to Russia or the EU. There is no such debate in the Baltic States, all three are members of the EU and NATO and are fully within the Western fold. Membership of NATO is of key importance here, no sovereign nation has invaded on of its members since its formation in 1949.

Another difference between Ukraine/Crimea and the Baltic states is of demographics and population. Estonia and Latvia have the highest proportions of ethnic Russians of the former USSR with 24.8% and 26.9% respectively. Compare this to Ukraine which has ‘only’ 17.3% ethnic Russians. But comparing country-wide percentages is not being intellectually honest. Russia has not invaded all of Ukraine, only Crimea. In Crimea 58.8% of the people are Russian. The population of these states is also important. Crimea has a population of 2.4 million, larger than both Estonia (1.3 million) and Latvia (2 million), only Lithuania with a population of 3 million is larger than Crimea. Lithuania has also got far fewer ethnic Russians, who make up only 5.8% of the population. There are more Russians in Crimea than the three Baltic States combined. The Estonian county of Ida-Viru has only 140,000 people in it. Would Putin really risk war with the West over an insignificant Estonian county? (no offence people of Ida-Viru county) When looking at the Baltic States Putin would be forced to do a cost-benefit analysis. He would then find the potential costs way too high and the benefits too few. It would seem inconceivable, but Putin has proved to be unpredictably before and will likely be so in the future.

So if the Baltic States will not be his next target, what will? The most commonly talked about are eastern Ukraine and Moldova.

Moldova is a small, landlocked country sandwiched between Ukraine and Romania. The fact that it does not border Russia, or even the sea, makes it seem strange that it might be the next flashpoint in a new Cold War. The fact that only 9.4% of Moldova is ethnically Russian further confuses the situation. Yet, as was the case with Ukraine, the problem is only part of the country. When Moldova seceded from the Soviet Union in 1991 the eastern portion of Moldova, Transnistria, seceded from Moldova. Although no UN member recognises the independence of Transnistria, it has been de facto independent for over 20 years. Another key issue is the demographics of the pseudo-independent state, it is roughly evenly split between Moldovans, Russians and Ukrainians (32, 30 and 29 respectively). Unlike the Baltic States, Moldova is not an EU or NATO member and hence is not well protected from foreign aggression.

Yet the major problem with invading Transnistria would be how could they get there? The most likely scenario would involve going through Ukraine and possibly Moldova. This could further destabilise the situation in Ukraine, especially since it would put Russian troops extremely close to Ukraine’s 4^th largest city, Odessa. Once they had control of Transnistria there would be the issue of what to do next? To move in/out of Transnistria would involve going through Ukraine, or Moldova and Romania. Considering Russia would have violated the sovereignty of the former two, they would be unlikely to willingly help Russia. Another option would be to take more territory, considering Putin’s actions already, it is not unthinkable. One issue that could prevent Russian action in Transnistria is the reaction that the rest of Moldova would have. Moldova is hoping is one day enter the European fold, Russia violating their sovereignty would likely cause them to seek closer ties with Europe sooner.

So if Transnistria is unlikely to happen, what really are the chances of Russia invading eastern Ukraine? As I have explained previously, no Ukrainian Oblast has more than 40% ethnic Russians (other than Crimea). Yet who says that Russia has to take an entire Oblast, perhaps just part of it. The city of Donetsk is 48% Russian, could Putin decide that he would likely to take that city?

Assigning probabilities is pointless as it all depends on how the West acts going into the future. If the West does nothing then the chances of Russia taking action in Transnistria, eastern Ukraine or the Baltic states would increase. If Putin does go further and the West does not take military action then we are taking about appeasement. I know accusing Putin of acting like Hitler seems drastic, but it is true. Hitler took Czechoslovakia and Poland to ‘protect’ ethnic Germans. If Putin takes Ukraine and Moldova to ‘protect’ ethnic Russians then how is he any different?